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1. Introduction 
Since the mid-1900s firms have acquired many of the innovations for new products and 
manufacturing processes through their own research and development efforts, rather than 
through licensing agreements with independent scientists.  Internalizing the R&D enterprise has 
advantages over acquiring the innovations through arm’s-length transactions because of the 
complementarities between the research conducted and the firm's production function 
knowledge about the production function is costly to transmit to outsidersand because of the 
difficulty of motivating contractors (see Lamoreaux and Sokoloff, 1999).  But innovating in-
house creates a challenge: firms risk their scientists, researchers, and other key personnel leaving 
after a discovery to exploit it on their own.  One way that they can mitigate this risk is by 
patenting innovations as they are developed in the laboratory.  In this paper we examine 
theoretically and empirically how the threat of a scientist leaving affects the firm's patenting and 
R&D decisions. 
Through patenting, an innovating firm can attempt to prevent competitors from imitating 
new products and thus can preserve its market share.  Secrecy offers the firm an alternative 
means of securing the returns to R&D while avoiding both the legal expenses of patent 
application and infringement prosecution, and the potentially much greater losses from 
disclosing sensitive information to competitors (Friedman, Landes and Posner, 1991; Cohen, 
Nelson, and Walsh, 2000).  At the time patents are granted, the USPTO publishes the detailed 
technical information that firms have submitted in support of their patent application.  Rival 
firms may be able to use this information to innovate around the patent.  Nevertheless, in 
practice, firms often do not fully disclose the technical details of an innovation on patent 
applications.   Nor does a secrecy strategy necessarily prevent an innovating firm’s rivals gaining   2
access to its secrets through reverse engineering, espionage, and especially former employees.   
Technological know-how acquired through research experience is embedded in the 
scientist’s human capital.  This knowledge becomes available to a competitor when the employee 
switches jobs.  Economists have long suspected that the inter-firm mobility of scientists transmits 
technological know-how across firms (Arrow, 1962; Stephan, 1996), but evidence is often 
anecdotal and econometric evidence is scarce.  Levin, Klevoric, Nelson, and Winter (1987) 
present survey evidence that firms count the hiring of R&D employees from innovating firms as 
a means of learning about new technologies. Almeida and Kogut (1999) find that skilled 
engineers who hold major semiconductor patents experience high rates of inter-firm mobility.  
They find the scientific references that firms cite in their patent applications reflect the 
employment histories of their scientists, suggesting that ideas in the semiconductor industry are 
spread by the movement of key engineers among firms, especially within a geographical region.  
Articles in the business press suggest high tech firms actively encourage defections among 
competitors’ technological personnel.  Kerstetter (2000) and Hibbard (1998) provide several high 
profile examples of employee raids designed to gain access to competitors’ technologies, 
supporting Kerstetter's claim that Silicon Valley firms live by the philosophy, “If you have 
trouble with the competition, simply raid its talent.”  Recently documented increases in 
scientists’ and engineers’ inter-firm mobility (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2000
1) suggest that 
employee misappropriation of technological know-how may be on the rise, especially among 
high-tech firms.  
Trade secret laws and non-compete covenants in employment contracts, which provide 
that a leaving employee will not seek employment with the employer’s competitor or found a 
competing start-up company, do not appear to limit the risk of this kind of misappropriation (see   3
Bongiorno and Marcellino, 1996; Jenero and Schreiber, 1999). Trade secret laws are difficult to 
enforce.  Courts are reluctant to enforce non-compete covenants because of the restrictions they 
place on the worker's ability to secure employment (see Dworkin and Callahan, 1998; Gilson, 
1999; Koh, 1998).
2    Thus, firms and employees cannot easily contract around the 
misappropriation problem. 
The economics literature typically frames the patent as a device to exclude outsiders.  In 
this paper, we emphasize a patent’s role in protecting an innovating firm from insiders.  We 
hypothesize that a firm that risks losing innovations to departing scientists will move quickly to 
patent its scientists’ innovations.  As the likelihood of a quit rises, so should the utility of patent 
protection.  Increases in scientists’ mobility may therefore induce firms to substitute away from 
secrecy toward patenting, leading to an increase in firms’ propensities to patent per R&D dollar 
spent.  As an increase in the potential external return to the acquired knowledge entices them to 
leave innovating firms, scientists become willing to take a salary cut, reducing the wage bill and 
thus the cost of R&D for innovating firms.  This is the main story we investigate in this paper. 
The paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 lays out a formal model of a firm’s R&D 
and patenting decisions in an environment where scientist-employees turn over.  Sections 3 and 4 
respectively describe the data and explain our empirical strategy.  Section 5 describes our results.  
Finally, Section 6 concludes the paper and includes a discussion of the importance of the 
mobility of scientific personnel in explaining observed cross-sectional and intertemporal 
variation in patenting and in explaining variation in patent-R&D ratios by firm size.   
 
2.  Model of firm's patenting and R&D decision 
We formalize our ideas along the lines of Pakes and Nitzan (1983), who study how   4
innovating firms contract with their scientific personnel when scientists may leave to set up 
rivals.  We build on their model by allowing a firm to patent its innovations before the scientist 
leaves.  We start with an entrepreneur who wishes to develop an idea into a marketable product.  
The entrepreneur seeks to hire a scientist to develop the idea.  The scientist is the only additional 
input in the development process.  When a scientist is hired, the project’s development, 
production, and marketing take two periods.  In the first period, the scientist develops the idea 
into a viable prototype.  In the second period, the entrepreneur produces and markets the product, 
without the aid of the scientist.  We assume that the product's life on the market ends at the end 
of the second period and that the revenue, ρi ( ∈R
+), is a random variable realized at the 
beginning of the second period with subscript i standing for ‘internal.’  By the end of the first 
period, the scientist possesses knowledge that enables him, if he desires, to market the innovation 
himself.  At the beginning of the second period the entrepreneur and the scientist learn about the 
value of this knowledge to a rival.  We assume that this ‘external’ value is a random variable, ρe 
(∈R), and the joint density for ρe and ρi is f, which is known to the entrepreneur and the scientist 
at the outset.  ρe is the external value of the innovation net of moving costs, which include the 
set-up cost in the event the scientist establishes a start-up, or the search cost of finding a suitable 
rival firm otherwise, and any relocation expenses.  
If the scientist finds the external value of the innovation sufficiently attractive, he sets up 
or joins a rival. The entrepreneur and the rival then proceed to market slightly different but 
highly substitutable products, both with a single period product cycle. The appearance on the 
market of the rival’s product reduces the entrepreneur’s revenue by λρi, where λ  ∈ [0,1].   
Alternatively, if the scientist chooses to stay, the entrepreneur markets the product alone.  At the 
beginning of the second period, the entrepreneur decides whether to patent the product, taking   5
into account the effect of patenting on the scientist’s decision to leave.  Should the scientist 
leave, we assume the patent reduces the entrepreneur’s loss from the scientist’s appropriation to 
(1−δ)λρi, δ ∈ [0,1], and the revenues that the rival obtains from the substitutable good by γρi, γ 
∈ [0,1]. δ and γ are parameters that describe how the patent regulates the entrepreneur’s loss and 
the scientist’s gain from his knowledge appropriation.  We denote the patent’s out-of-pocket 
costs and the costs from information disclosure as ν.
3   (See Appendix I for a summary of 
notations used in the model.)   
We assume that the scientist like the entrepreneur is risk neutral and therefore maximizes 
his expected income.  The scientist chooses at the beginning of the first period whether to accept 
the entrepreneur’s offer or to work for another firm outside the R&D sector.  To simplify the 
analysis we assume that outside the R&D sector he would acquire no appropriable proprietary 
knowledge but would receive his marginal product, w, in either the first or the second period.
4  
The entrepreneur’s offer consists of a guaranteed first period wage, w0, and a second period 
wage, w1, when the scientist remains in the second period.  The entrepreneur specifies the second 
period wage only after ρe and ρi are realized, taking the scientist’s decision in the second period 
as given.  If the scientist accepts the job offer in the first period, at the beginning of the second 
period he chooses among three options based on the realized ρe and ρi.  He may remain with the 
entrepreneur, earning w1 and performing work equal in value to w.  He may set up or join a 
rival, performing work equal in value to w , and, in addition, marketing the entrepreneur’s 
knowledge and receiving its full value, ρe (or ρe−γρi, if the entrepreneur has patented).  Finally, 
he may move to the non-R&D sector and earn w. Table 1 describes the entrepreneur’s profit and 
scientist’s second period wage for each combination of patenting and mobility decisions.  
   6
Table 1: Payoff to the scientist and profit to the entrepreneur in the second period 
Scientist moves to rival  Entrepreneur patents  Scientist’s payoff  Entrepreneur’s profit 
No  (p=0)  w1(p=0)  ρi − w1(p=0) + w  No 
Yes (p=1)  w1(p=1)  ρi − w1(p=1) + w − ν 
No (p=0)  ρe + w  ρi − λρi  Yes 
Yes (p=1)  ρe − γρi + w  ρi − (1-δ)λρi − ν 
Note:  The scientist either stays with the entrepreneur or moves to a rival. As we explain below, he never moves to 
the non-R&D sector. 
 
The entrepreneur’s objective is to maximize expected profits from the project.  The 
expected profit from hiring a scientist is,  
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where the indicator p is 1 if the entrepreneur patents and zero otherwise, S is the set of ρe and ρi 
such that the scientist stays, and M is the set of ρe and ρi such that the scientist moves to a rival.  
We define N as the remaining set of ρe and ρi such that the scientist moves to the non-R&D 
sector.  Moving to the non-R&D sector has no effect on the entrepreneur’s expected profit. Note 
we are ignoring discounting for simplicity.  Note also that the wage w1 in the second period 
depends on the value of ρe and ρi and the entrepreneur’s patenting decision.  The entrepreneur 
hires the scientist if the expected profit is positive.  The scientist accepts the contract in the first 
period if the expected earnings in two periods exceed 2w:   
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The entrepreneur’s problem is to choose p, w0, and w1 to maximize (1) subject to the scientist’s 
participation constraint, (2).  The following derivation of the optimal patent and wage policy 
assumes a time-consistent equilibrium in which the entrepreneur and the scientist take the other 
party’s decision in the second period as given.   
In this framework, the scientist correctly anticipates that if he accepts the compensation 
package offer of w0 and w1, when the second period arrives, the entrepreneur will offer the wage 
that maximizes her second period net earnings.  The entrepreneur sets w0 so that the scientist’s 
expected value of the contract equals his reservation earnings in two periods, 2w .  Thus, to 
derive the firm’s patent and wage policy, we first derive for each realized ρe and ρi the w1 and p 
that maximize the entrepreneur’s second period net revenue.  We then substitute the optimal 
second period policy into (2) with equality to form the scientist’s expected second period payoff 
and solve for w0.  In this derivation, we assume that the entrepreneur’s gain from patenting 
exceeds the rival’s loss, i.e. δλρi > γρi.  This assumption is not crucial to the model and our main 
implications still hold under the alternative assumption.
5   
In our model, any exogenous change in the joint distribution of ρe and ρi can affect the 
entrepreneur’s and the scientist’s decisions.  To simplify the analysis, assume that the random 
variable ρe is equal to  e ρ + εe and that ρi is equal to  i ρ  + εi, where εe and εi (εe∈R, εi>− i ρ ) are 
mean zero random variables with joint density g, and  e ρ  and  i ρ  are the constant means of ρe and 
ρi, respectively.   
For any draw of ρe and ρi at the beginning of the second period, one can easily show that 
from the scientist's perspective moving to the non-R&D sector cannot pay more than either   8
staying or moving to a rival pays.  Thus, the only issue to resolve is whether the scientist stays or 
moves to a rival firm.  The entrepreneur’s wage and patent policies and the scientist's mobility 
decision are depicted in Figure 1 on the εi-εe space.  The derivation of the figure is detailed in 
Appendix II.  Intuitively, Figure 1 indicates that a scientist is more likely to move the higher is 
the value of εe, given εi.  Also, a scientist is more likely to stay, the higher is the value of εi, 
given εe.  Regardless of the value of εi, when εe is low enough the entrepreneur has no incentive 
to patent since the threat of the scientist leaving is minimal.  Regardless of the value of εe, when 
εi is low enough the entrepreneur will not patent because the potential loss without patent 
protection is small. 
Substituting the optimal second period wage, patent, and mobility choices, into the 
participation constraint (2) yields w0, the optimal wage in the first period. w0 equates the 
scientist’s expected payoff from accepting the entrepreneur’s offer and his reservation earnings.
6  
Substituting the optimal wage for w0 in (1) gives us the following expression for the expected 
profit:  
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This equation shows the cost and benefit of patenting.  The last term on the right hand side of 
(1′) reflects the cost of patenting, which the entrepreneur bears both when the scientist stays and 
moves to a rival.  The fourth term shows that patenting benefits the entrepreneur only when the 
scientist moves to a rival, and then, only to the extent that δλρi−γρi>0.  The benefit from 
patenting is less than δλρi because any reduction in the scientist’s expected gain from moving is   9
anticipated by the scientist in the first period, and therefore must be added to the scientist’s first 
period wage.  The expected profit does not show a benefit for patenting when the scientist stays 
because the patent’s benefit to the entrepreneurthe reduction in w1 by γρirepresents an 
equivalent loss to the scientist, and thus must be added to the scientist’s first period wage offer.  
Thus, patenting in the event that the scientist stays in the second period lowers her total profits, 
owing to the patenting cost ν.   
  The following proposition describes the effect of a change in the mobility of scientists in 
our model. 
 
Proposition 1.  An increase in the mean of ρe,  e ρ , increases the probability of a scientist moving 
to a rival.  An increase in  e ρ  also raises the entrepreneur's propensity to patent an innovation. 
 
Figure 2 shows the effect of an increase in  e ρ  on the boundaries that divide εi-εe space 
into regions of patenting/no patenting and moving/staying.   The dashed boundaries in Figure 2 
result from an increase in  e ρ .  A scientist’s likelihood of moving rises with the return to moving, 
and an increase in  e ρ  means that the scientist will depart for lower draws of ε than before, shown 
as the expanding area of mobility in Figure 2 (Regions R1, R2, and R3).  The increase in the 
return to moving raises the likelihood that the entrepreneur patents the innovation and Regions 
R2 and R4 in Figure 2 illustrate her response.  Region R2 reflects an increase in patenting as she 
attempts to reduce the revenue loss from the departing scientist passing on his knowledge to 
rivals.  The increased patenting represented by Region R4 arises even though the entrepreneur 
knows the scientist will stay.  The entrepreneur patents more often to lower the scientist’s second 
period reservation wage, which has risen with  e ρ .    10
It is not improbable that a shock that raises  e ρ  affects  i ρ  simultaneously in the same 
direction.  For example, a demand shock that increases the value of an innovation to the 
entrepreneur may also increase its value to the rival.  Depending on the relative magnitude of a 
rise in  e ρ  to that in  i ρ , we can derive three cases.  First, if the value ( e ρ− λ i ρ ) rises as both 
parameters  e ρ  and  i ρ  are increased, we can show that the areas for mobility and for patenting in 
Figure 1 expand and hence the probabilities for both will be raised.  Second, if ( e ρ− λ i ρ ) falls 
but [ e ρ− λ (1−δ) i ρ ] rises, only the probability of patenting is raised unambiguously.  Finally, 
suppose the shock raises the value of an innovation much more in the current firm than outside 
of the firm and so both ( e ρ− λ i ρ ) and [ e ρ −λ(1−δ) i ρ ] fall.  In this case, we can show that the 
probability that the scientist departs for a rival declines unambiguously while the change in the 
probability that the firm patents is ambiguous.   
 
Proposition 2.  If  e ρ  and  i ρ  rise simultaneously either by the same amount or by the same 
proportion, both the probability of a scientist moving to a rival and the entrepreneur's propensity 
to patent an innovation rise. 
 
Equivalent increases in both parameters are a special case of the first case in the 
preceding paragraph since λ < 1.  Figure 3 illustrates the case described in Proposition 2. 
One might imagine that because ν includes the cost of information disclosure, ν rises 
with the value of the project to the firm, ρi.  In the case where ν is proportional to ρi, one can 
easily confirm the finding in proposition 2: simultaneous and equivalent increases in  e ρ  and  i ρ  
raise the probability of mobility and the entrepreneur's propensity to patent.  This result also   11
holds when ν = v+ψ, where ψ is a random variable and v is proportional to  i ρ .
7 
The expected R&D expenditures for a research project, excluding the patenting cost, are 
as follows,  
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where the second equality comes from equation (2).  The effect of an increase in  e ρ  on the R&D 
expenditures is analyzed in Proposition 3.
8 
 
Proposition 3.  An increase in  e ρ  reduces the expected R&D expenditures of an innovation. 
Proof. Differentiating R&D in (3) with respect to  e ρ  yields 
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other terms in the brackets are positive. ■   12
 
A rightward shift in the distribution of ρe, and therefore an increase in the mobility of a 
scientist, implies that the entrepreneur will be better able to exploit the gains to leaving, reducing 
the wage she has to pay the scientist.  In other words, the scientist is willing to accept a lower 
wage when the prospects from leaving improve, which reduces the expected R&D expenditures.
9  
For the effect of simultaneous increases in  e ρ  and  i ρ   on R&D expenditures, we have the 
following proposition. 
 
Proposition 4.  Simultaneously adding equivalent amounts to  e ρ  and  i ρ  reduces the expected 
R&D expenditures of an innovation if γ is small enough relative to δλ.  (The proof can be 
provided upon request.) 
 
  The effect of an increase in  e ρ  on the profitability of a research project is ambiguous, 
however.  For a given value of εi where ν/(δλ)− i ρ ≤ εi < ν/γ− i ρ , differentiating the profit with 
respect to  e ρ  yields 
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*
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The first term on the right hand side of the equation is positive, reflecting the reduction in the 
scientist's wage following the improvement in his return from moving.
10  This effect is opposed 
by the increase in the entrepreneur's patenting expenses that follow from the increased mobility 
caused by the rise in  e ρ .  This effect is shown in the second term on the right hand side.   
γ(εi+ i ρ ) is the profit reduction when the entrepreneur switches from a no-patenting to a 
patenting policy and the scientist goes from staying to moving.   ) , ( g
*
e3 i ε ε  is the probability of   13
the policy switch (see Region R2 in Figure 2).  In the case where εi ≥ ν/γ− i ρ , these opposing 
effects remain and thus the effect of the  e ρ  on profitability is again ambiguous.  If εi<ν/(δλ)− i ρ , 
we can show that an increase in  e ρ  unambiguously raises the expected profit for the entrepreneur 
since the wage paid to a scientist is made lower without any additional increase in patenting cost.   
  If the entrepreneur’s commitment to a labor contract can be enforced without cost in the 
second period (e.g., through reputation), the equilibrium wage and patent policy will be different 
from those in the equilibrium described in this section since the entrepreneur and the scientist 
can achieve a Pareto improvement by avoiding unnecessary patenting and its attendant costs 
when the scientist stays.  One can show that in the commitment equilibrium, the firm patents less 
frequently, and that propositions 1 and 2 hold (the proof can be provided upon request). 
 
3. Data  description 
We test our prediction on the relationship between labor mobility and the patent propensity 
against firm-level panel data. The dependent variable is the firm’s patent count, and the explanatory 
variables are the firm’s R&D expenditures and a measure of the labor mobility of research 
scientists, among others.  
Our labor mobility data for scientists and engineers are taken from the Annual 
Demographic Files (March Supplements) of the Current Population Survey (CPS), conducted by 
the U.S. Census Bureau.  Our labor mobility is measured by the turnover experience of all 
scientists and engineers,
11 based on whether a scientist changed employers during the previous 
year of the survey.  The main advantages of using CPS March data are that the mobility can be 
defined consistently in every year since 1975, and that the CPS data represent a national   14
population without the problem of attrition, in contrast to other panel data sources like the PSID. 
(See Stewart, 1998, for more details on the CPS data.)  The March CPS generates on average 
records on 2,600 scientists and engineers annually between 1975 and 1997.  
Our basic measure of job mobility is the share of scientists and engineers in each 
industry and year who changed their employers at least once within the previous year.
 12  We 
call this measure the employer change rate (ECR).  We compute separate measures by industry 
because we presume that the likelihood of a scientist leaving is mainly imposed on a firm by 
conditions in the firm’s industry, and that industry-specific capital means scientists are 
significantly more likely to stay in the same industry when they change firms.
13  Regardless of 
how broadly we define the labor market in constructing our mobility measure, we may face a 
problem of reverse causality, that is, from patents to mobility.  To minimize the problem, we 
account for possible endogeneity in our mobility measure (see section 5).   
We compute a second measure of job mobility for scientists and engineers by 
geographical region and year (GEO).  This second measure recognizes that for many scientists 
and engineers movement occurs within geographically defined markets, i.e., they may seek 
employment opportunities only within the region that they live.  In this case, the job turnover 
facing a firm will be strongly related to labor mobility within its geographical area.
14   
Information on the number of patents, R&D expenditures, and other characteristics of 
each firm by year is taken from the data set recently created by researchers at the National 
Bureau of Economic Research and Case Western Reserve University.  They created this data set 
by matching the patents in the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) to their assignees in 
the Standard and Poor’s Compustat database.  The patent data at the USPTO contain a wealth of 
information on each patent including the name of the assignee, a firm in about 70 percent of   15
cases.  The Compustat database contains extensive data (including R&D expenditures) on all 
publicly traded firms.  To obtain the correct matching of patent to firm, NBER-Case Western 
Reserve University researchers undertook an extensive effort to link subsidiaries listed in the 
USPTO database to their parent companies in the manufacturing sector.  They then matched the 
patents to the parent firms in the Compustat database for the period between 1964 and 1992.
15  
While the matching would not be perfectly representative because about 30 percent of patent 
grantees are non-firm organizations and individuals, nevertheless, the patents captured in this 
process would comprise most of the patents originating from firms because most large patenting 
organizations are both in the manufacturing sector and publicly traded. 
The USPTO-Compustat data set contains about 4,800 firms in an unbalanced panel, 
extending from 1957 to 1995.  The average number of firms in the data each year is about 1,700, 
ranging from a low of 691 in 1961 to a high of 2,054 in 1992.  The USPTO granted 3,585 patents 
to the firms in the data set who applied for patent grants in 1961.  The number of patents granted 
reached 16,553 in 1992.  The data indicate a decline in the number of patents granted after 1992 
because of the time lag between application and grant.  Patent applications in the last two years 
of the data set were still under review at the USPTO in 1995.  For this reason, we use only firm 
data prior to 1993.  For reasons we explain below, we use only the years following 1975.   
Table 2 reports summary statistics of mobility measures and other variables used in our 
analysis.  Panel 1 of Table 2 shows the statistics of the sample before we exclude firms with no 
R&D expenditures.  Panel 2 shows the characteristics of the subsample used in the estimation of 
the determinants of patenting.  Because the subsample contains only those firm-years for which 
positive levels of R&D expenditures are reported, it is much smaller.  Note that the firms that 
most often report positive levels of R&D are both large (by the sales measure) and employ high   16
levels of plants and equipment relative to labor.   
 
4. Empirical  strategy 
As our starting point, we consider the effect of the mobility of scientists on the firm’s 
patenting decision following the Poisson-based econometric specification of Hausman, Hall, and 
Griliches (1984), and Hall and Ziedonis (2001).  We favor a Poisson-based specification because 
the number of patents granted to a firm in a particular year is a count variable, often taking the 
value of zero or one.  We assume that the expected number of patents granted to a firm, 
conditional on its characteristics, is 
  ) exp( ) , | ( ζ β β α λ ft
R
ft ft f ft ft ft ft M R X M X P E + + + = =  
where Pft is the number of patents granted to firm f that were applied for in year t, Xft is a 1xK 
vector of firm f’s characteristics in year t,  ft R   is the logarithm of firm f’s year t  R&D 
expenditures deflated by the GNP deflator, and Mft measures the level of job mobility among 
scientists and engineers working for firm f in period t.  Properly measured, the variation in Mft 
reflects variation in exogenous determinants of mobility, such as changes in the external net 
value of innovation ρe in our model.  We include R&D expenditures because we wish to test the 
theoretical result that mobility raises the firm’s propensity to patent holding the R&D constant. 
Following Hall and Ziedonis, Xft includes the logarithms of sales (LnSALES), as a measure of 
the size of the firm, to account for scale economies in producing patents, and the capital-labor 
ratio (LnK/L), measured as the deflated plant and equipment over the number of employees.
16 
We include the capital labor ratio because given R&D expenditures a highly capitalized firm 
may have stronger incentives to patent than less capitalized firms.  A patent infringement suit 
that leads to court injunction and production stoppage will be more destructive for a firm that has   17
made a large capital investment in a state-of-the-art physical plant.  Such vulnerability may 
encourage the firm to develop a diverse portfolio of patents that it can use as a bargaining chip to 
ward off infringement suits (Cohen et al., 2000; Parr and Sullivan, 1996).  We assume that the 
firm specific constant term, αf, is random and that exp(αf) is distributed gamma.  We obtain 
estimates of β, β
R, and ζ, using maximum likelihood estimation techniques for the Poisson-
gamma mixture. 
 
5. Empirical  results 
  Table 3 shows our estimation results of the determinants of the firm’s patenting decision, 
employing the random-effects Poisson model as described in section 4.  The dependent variable 
is the firm’s patent applications in year t that were eventually granted. In all panels in the table, 
the explanatory variables include the logarithm of our mobility measure (LnECR or LnGEO)
17, 
of sales (LnSALES), of the capital-labor ratio (LnK/L), and of R&D expenditures (LnR&D), all 
measured in year t.
18  Note that in relating our mobility measure with the contemporaneous 
patenting count, we are assuming that the threat of a scientists’ departure affects the firm’s 
patenting decision in the same period.  We also include as a regressor the logarithm of the mean 
age of scientists and engineers in each industry by year (LnAGE) because of the link between 
age and turnover (see, for example, Hall, 1982).  Inter-firm mobility is much higher among the 
young, who also have fewer skills and are less productive.  By adding age, we partly control for 
the changing distribution of skills in the labor force that may accompany changes in the mobility, 
and thus we more precisely isolate the effect of mobility on patents.  Note that in the Poisson 
specification the estimated coefficients for the log-transformed regressors have an elasticity 
interpretation.       18
In Panel 1, we find that both R&D expenditures and sales are strongly positively related 
to patenting.  This finding is repeated in the other regressions in Table 3.  We find in this table 
that the estimated effect of LnK/L on patenting is not generally consistent with the theoretical 
prediction and the effect’s estimated sign varies across specifications.  The estimated effect of 
LnAGE suggests that more experienced researchers are more productive in generating patents. 
Holding constant the mean age of scientists in the relevant year and industry and the firm’s R&D 
expenditures, the estimated effect of mobility on patenting is positive and significant.  This is 
consistent with our story: the increased likelihood of a scientist departing the firm increases the 
employer's incentive to patent an innovation.   
The key variables in our estimation may be time trended, in which case the estimated 
effect of LnECR on patenting could be spurious.  To test the sensitivity of our result to a time 
trend effect, we introduce the time trend, T, as an additional right-hand side variable.  The results 
reported in Panel 2 show that the effect of LnECR is still positive and significant with T 
included.  Panel 3 adds to the base specification the square of the log of R&D expenditures to 
test whether elasticity of patenting with respect to R&D changes with the size of the R&D 
operation.  The coefficient corresponding to (LnR&D)
2 is positive but insignificant.  
Panels 4 and 5 respectively show the results from re-estimating the Panels 1 and 2 
specifications using the geographical measure for mobility (GEO).
19   The age variable (AGE) 
used in this table is defined for the firm’s region and year. We find the effect of mobility on 
patenting is significantly positive and the magnitude of the effect is greater than that found using 
ECR.
20  The estimates of the coefficients corresponding to LnSALES and LnR&D in Panels 4 
and 5 are similar to their counterparts in Panels 1 and 2. 
Note that our theoretical analysis implies a relationship between ρe and patenting, not   19
between mobility and patenting.  We use mobility as a proxy for ρe because ρe cannot directly be 
observed.  We argue that because mobility is a monotonic function of ρe, say M(ρe), a positive 
relationship found between mobility and patenting implies a positive relationship between ρe and 
patenting.  We recognize that this approach is loose but it yields a simple way to estimate an 
approximate size and direction of the effect of ρe on patenting.  If we take our model seriously, 
however, the appropriate regressor is not M, but the inverse function of M whose functional form 
is unknown.  Olley and Pakes (2000) suggest that in situations like this the function can be 
approximated non-parametrically, say by a polynomial expansion.  
Panel 6 shows the results of a Poisson regression, with a sixth order polynomial 
expansion of ECR used in place of LnECR.
21    Only the estimates of the coefficients 
corresponding to the first three terms are reported; the z scores for the coefficient estimates 
corresponding to the higher order terms were quite small.  In this specification, the test of our 
model is whether any coefficient estimates corresponding to the polynomial terms are 
significant.  We take the fact that the coefficient estimates for the first, second, and third order 
terms are significant as evidence that ρe affects patenting. 
In addition to the random effects specifications, we estimated fixed-effects Poisson 
models (results not shown), which show qualitatively and quantitatively similar impacts of labor 
mobility on patenting.  We also tested the sensitivity of our estimates to the distributional 
assumption for the random effect.  The estimated effect of mobility was as pronounced whether 
we assumed its distribution normal or gamma. 
Table 4 reports the results of additional sensitivity analyses of mobility’s effect on 
patenting propensity.  To control for the potential endogeneity of R&D expenditures and our 
measures of mobility, we use generalized method of moments (GMM) to estimate the patent-  20
mobility relationship with the mobility measures and R&D treated as endogenous variables.
22  
Recall that the model says that while changes in mobility may lead firms to patent more often, by 
patenting more often a firm may induce some of its scientists to move.  Our model thus predicts 
that higher patenting leads to more mobility.  This direction of causality should be more 
important the more narrowly we define the firm’s labor market.  In the limiting case, where we 
define the firm’s labor market as the pool of worker’s working at the firm, the endogeneity of the 
mobility estimate is obvious.  Our model also says that firms jointly determine whether to patent 
and how much to spend on R&D.  
We begin with the assumption that the random variable Pft is related to the explanatory 
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where µft=exp(Xftβ+Rftβ
R+ Mftζ), αf is now the firm-specific fixed effect, qf =exp(αf), and uft is 
the error term.  Rft and Mft are assumed endogenous, that is, E(Rft uft) ≠ 0 and E(Mft uft) ≠ 0.  We 
use Wooldridge’s quasi-differencing transformation to remove the fixed effects (see Wooldridge, 
1991, 1997 and Windmeijer, 2000), which leads to the following moment conditions: 
































where s ≥ 2 for Zft= Rft, Mft and s ≥ 0 when Zft includes Xft and additional instruments (described 
below).   
In our empirical work, the instruments and lags we use produce more moment conditions 
than the number of parameters we wish to estimate.  Our estimates of the parameters minimize a 
quadratic function formed by the weighted sample moment conditions corresponding to (4) and   21
the data.  The GMM model adds generality by allowing the regressor  ft M and  ft R  to  be 
correlated with the contemporaneous and past realizations of the residual.  In this way, we allow 
patenting to “cause” mobility and R&D expenditure decisions.
23  
The specifications in Panels 1 and 2 of Table 4 are identical to the specifications in 
Panels 1 and 4 of Table 3, respectively.  We use lagged mobility and the logarithms of the 
fractions of scientists who are white (LnWHITE) and who are male (LnMALE) as instruments 
for mobility in all panels of the table.  We use the latter two variables as instruments because of 
the well-known finding in the empirical literature that non-whites and women have higher rates 
of turnover (see Mincer and Jovanovic, 1981).
24  We instrument R&D expenditures with lagged 
R&D.
25   
Like the Poisson estimation, the GMM estimation generates statistically significant and 
positive estimates of the effect of labor mobility on patenting propensity.  Interestingly, the 
coefficient estimates on both measures of mobility estimated by the GMM are quantitatively 
smaller than those from the Poisson estimation.  This finding is consistent with our theoretical 
story that reverses the causality: by patenting more often the firm induces some of its scientists to 
move.  By controlling for this direction of causality, the GMM estimation shows a smaller effect 
of the mobility measure on patenting propensity. 
The mobility of scientific personnel within an R&D-doing firm’s geographical area 
shows a pronounced, statistically significant, positive effect on the firm’s patents.  This finding 
has an implication for the literature on spillovers.  Jaffe, Trajtenberg, and Henderson (1993) 
report that in their patent applications, firms often cite the work of external scientists, but that 
these scientists tend to work locally.  Their findings suggest that geographical proximity is 
necessary for a technological spillover to take place.  Our finding that geographical mobility has   22
a strong effect on patenting propensity suggests that the movement of researchers among firms 
(and between academia and firms) may be an important mechanism for the transmission of these 
spillovers. 
Panel 3 includes calendar year dummies as additional regressors instead of a time trend as 
in Panel 2 of Table 3.  Note that in this specification the estimated coefficient associated with 
LnECR captures only cross-industry variation in LnECR.  The coefficient estimate associated 
with LnECR is positive and significant.  When we include as regressors industry dummies in 
Panel 4 so that we have only within-industry variation in LnECR, the coefficient estimate 
associated with LnECR is significant and slightly greater than the coefficient estimate associated 
with calendar year dummies.  This result indicates that variation in patenting propensity is not 
only driven by cross-industry variation but also by time series variation in our ECR mobility 
measure.  
In Panels 5 and 6, we repeat the same specifications in Panels 3 and 4 with LnGEO in 
place of LnECR.  Unlike ECR, variations in patenting can be mostly accounted for by within-
region, time-series variation of our geographical mobility measure GEO, but not by its cross-
region variation.  One explanation for this is that the number of regions is significantly fewer 
than the number of industries in our data.   
Past researchers (e.g., Kortum and Lerner, Hall and Ziedonis) have isolated for study 
industries in the so-called high technology sector.  Panels 7-10 show the results from splitting the 
sample into a high-tech and non high-tech subsamples.  Following Chandler (Business History 
Review, Summer 1994), we define high-tech industries to include computers and computing 
equipment, electrical machinery, electronic instruments and communication equipment, 
transportation equipment, optical and medical instruments, and pharmaceuticals.  Panels 7 and 8   23
include LnECR while Panels 9 and 10 include LnGEO.  The estimates of the elasticity of 
patenting with respect to our mobility measures are in general statistically significant for both 
regressions.  However, the estimate is about five times larger for the high-tech industry sample in 
case of LnECR and about two times larger in case of LnGEO.  
 
6. Concluding  remarks 
In the first half of the paper, we developed a model for understanding the effect of the 
threat of a scientist’s technology transfer to a rival on his employer’s R&D and patenting 
decisions.  In our model, while working in the employer’s laboratory, scientists develop technical 
knowledge that in later periods they can exploit at a rival firm.  Because this technological 
knowledge has value with other employers, it is general human capital for which the scientist is 
willing to pay.   Like Pakes and Nitzan, we show that when the return to leaving rises, the wages 
a firm pays for the scientist’s services drop, and so do the R&D expenditures. We also show that 
when patenting reduces the firm’s loss when the scientist leaves or his wage when he stays by 
more than the patenting cost, the firm patents.  
Our regression results show that a firm's patenting propensity and mobility rates for 
scientists and engineers are positively correlated, consistent with our hypothesis that firms use 
patenting to minimize the harm caused by departing scientists.  Our finding that mobility of 
scientists and engineers within geographical regions has a pronounced effect on patenting is 
consistent with evidence elsewhere of localized technological spillover effects.  Our findings are 
robust to various sensitivity analyses we conduct, including models that take into account the 
potential endogeneity of our labor mobility measures.   
Our results are not only statistically significant, but economically significant as well.  The   24
average number of patents per real R&D dollar in our data varies by industry and region.  The 
mean patent-R&D ratiowhere R&D is measured in millions of 1982-84 dollarsranges from 
0.62 to 3.13 across the 15 industries we study, and from 1.29 to 4.54 across the 9 geographical 
regions.  Our empirical estimates suggest that a reduction in the industry-specific measure of 
mobility (ECR) by one half would lower a typical firm's patent-R&D ratio by 2 percent; a 
reduction in the geographic-specific measure of mobility (GEO) by one half would lower this 
ratio by 9 percent.
26  Moreover, our estimation results can explain some of the increase in the 
economy-wide patent-R&D ratio since the mid-1980s (see Kortum and Lerner, 1998).  Our 
mobility measure increases from 0.125 in 1984 to 0.156 in 1997, a 25 percent increase.
27  This 
change accounts for 0.7 to 3 points (or 4 to 17 percent) of the 18 percent increase in the patent-
R&D ratio over the period 1984-97.
28  
Our results may help explain the substantial variation that we observe in patent-R&D 
ratios across firms of different size.  Griliches (1990) attributes the higher patent-R&D ratios in 
small firms to selection bias and the differential role of formal R&D for small and large firms.  
Our data show researchers working in firms whose employment levels range from 0 to 499, from 
500 to 999, and above 1000 have employer change rates of 0.20, 0.16, and 0.11, respectively.
29  
This is consistent with the finding in the labor literature that the job turnover rate is significantly 
higher among workers in small firms (see Oi, 1983).  Our data show that the patent-R&D ratio of 
the smallest group divided by the ratio of the largest group is 0.433/0.371 = 1.17.  Of this 17 
percent difference between the patent-R&D ratios of small versus large firms, our estimates can 
explain 2 to 8 points, or 12 to 47 percent.   
While the empirical results generally support the implications of our theoretical model, 
we have left a number of issues unaddressed.  First, our paper ignores the effect of a departing   25
scientist on the receiving firm’s or rival’s patenting decision. Suppose the incoming scientist 
brought to his new employer an idea that could be used to develop a “spillover” good.  As the 
scientist is brought on board, or shortly afterwards, the new employer might patent some part of 
the technology underlying the spillover good.  However, at the same time, the firm’s R&D 
expenditure would rise, as the firm must compensate the scientist.  Depending on the size of the 
compensation and what fraction of it appears in the firm’s R&D budget, the firm’s patent-R&D 
ratio may rise or fall upon hiring the scientist.   
Second, we have not addressed a number of issues behind the increase in mobility.  For 
instance, we have not dealt with the effect of labor mobility on the organization of R&D 
activities in firms.  Nor have we investigated more fundamental forces behind the labor mobility 
change of scientists such as changes in R&D spillovers and other labor market factors.  We leave 
these issues to future work.   26
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Table 2  Sample Statistics 
 
 (1)  (2) 
  Full Sample (31503 obs)  R&D Sample (21030 obs) 








Patents  7.89  40.41 0  10  11.50  48.98 0  20 
R&D (million $ 1982-84)  19.08  122.91  0  22.26  28.58  149.53  0.17  41.04 
ECR  0.12 0.04 0.07 0.18 0.12 0.04 0.06 0.17 
GEO  0.13 0.02 0.10 0.16 0.13 0.02 0.10 0.16 
SALES (million $ 1982-84)  863.1  4099.7  6.44  1560.6  1034.6  4705.7  5.72  1984.9 
K/L  2006.7  47546.6 0.83  795.0 2645.2  58034.2 0.69  937.9 
AGE_ECR  38.32 1.81 35.89  40.47  38.28 1.81 35.88  40.47 
AGE_GEO  37.75 0.77 36.97  38.61  37.75 0.78 36.81  38.56 
MALE  0.83 0.10 0.69 0.95 0.84 0.10 0.70 0.95 
WHITE  0.92 0.04 0.87 0.97 0.92 0.04 0.86 0.97 
Notes:    (1) R&D sample contains only firms that report positive R&D expenditures 
(2) ECR = share of scientists and engineers who changed their employers at least once within the one-year period, by industry and year 
  (3) GEO = share of scientists and engineers who changed their employers at least once within the one-year period, by location and year 
  (4) K/L = Plants and equipments (mil. 1982-84$)/employment (1000s) 
  (5) AGE_ECR (AGE_GEO) = average age of scientists and engineers by industry and year (by location and year) 
  (6) MALE (WHITE) = fractions of scientists and engineers who are male (white) 
  
 
    
Table 3  Patenting Regressions 
 
Dependent  Variable:  Patents                           Random Effects Poisson Model 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  Coef. z Coef. z Coef. z Coef. z Coef. z Coef. z 
              
LnECR  0.0287  5.23  0.0255  4.63  0.0257  4.66        
LnGEO         0.1303  7.03  0.0596  3.11    
LnSALES  0.4128 43.43 0.3971 41.04 0.3962 40.93 0.3469 28.71 0.3649 30.08 0.3917 40.38 
LnK/L  -0.0077 -7.16 -0.0034 -2.98 -0.0036 -3.05 0.0334 16.18 0.0381 18.22  -0.0037 -3.16 
LnR&D  0.3090 38.53 0.3474 38.15 0.3320 25.43 0.4041 38.15 0.3396 29.53 0.3492 38.29 
(LnR&D)
2       0.0022  1.64        
LnAGE  0.9580 17.72 1.0217  8.74  1.0236 18.77 3.2061 17.19 2.2144 11.15 1.0026 18.15 
T      -0.0053 -8.92 -0.0057 -8.93      0.0124 14.40  -0.0040 -6.67 
ECR             90.0545  6.34 
ECR
2              -2377.06 -6.80 
ECR
3             30405.25 7.14 






























Note:  The z columns report the ratios of the coefficient to its standard error.  The p value reported is of the test that the population coefficients are jointly zero.  The 
random effects follow a gamma distribution.  The last row reports a Wald chi-square statistic for testing the specification in the column.  Column 6 reports the results from 
of an estimation that contains a sixth order polynomial expansion of ECR.  The coefficient estimates for fourth order terms and higher are omitted from the table due to 
space considerations.    
Table 4  Patent Regressions: Sensitivity Analyses 
 
Dependent Variable: Patents 
 (1) (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) (6) 
 GMM  GMM  Poisson   









 Coef.  z  Coef.  z  Coef.  z  Coef.  z  Coef. z Coef. z 
                     
LnECR  0.0081  6.34      0.0256 4.36 0.0292 5.31         
LnGEO      0.0471  4.17       0.0157  0.47  0.1264  6.82 
LnSALES  0.2810  26.95  0.1746  19.07  0.3420 34.37 0.4324 43.98 0.3198  25.92  0.3662  29.23 
LnK/L  0.0025  1.29 0.0407 10.34 0.0334  21.34  -0.0076  -7.13  0.0382 18.29 0.0337 16.32 
LnR&D  0.1066  16.82  0.1629  18.39  0.3630 39.47 0.3001 36.86 0.3713  31.92  0.3975  36.91 
LnAGE  0.2239  4.21  1.0844  9.71  0.2886 4.90 0.9534  17.62  0.6484  2.45  3.1653  16.96 













































Note:  The z columns report the ratios of the coefficient to its standard error. The p values given in columns 1 and 2 are for the test of the null hypothesis that the 
moment conditions hold for all instruments. The p values in columns 3-6 are of the test that the population coefficients are jointly zero. Columns 1 and 2 are the results 
of the Generalized Method of Moments while the rest of the table is based on random-effects Poisson estimation. The random effects are assumed to follow a gamma 
distribution.  Estimated coefficients for calendar year dummies and industry dummies in columns 3-6 are not reported to save space.    
Table 4  Patent Regressions: Sensitivity Analyses (continued) 
 
Dependent Variable: Patents  
  (7) (8) (9)  (10) 
 Poisson 
High tech firms 
Poisson 
Non high tech firms 
Poisson 
High tech firms 
Poisson 
Non high tech firms 
  Coef. z Coef. z Coef. z Coef. z 
          
LnECR  0.0154 9.11 0.0032 1.46         
LnGEO       0.1637  6.33  0.0878  3.29 
LnSALES  0.4195 29.65 0.3953 29.76 0.4078 22.96 0.2872 16.46 
LnK/L  0.0071 4.43 -0.0166  -11.34  0.0283 8.42 0.0356  13.48 
LnR&D  0.2985 25.41 0.3108 27.78 0.3563 23.86 0.4390 28.00 
LnAGE  1.9293 25.34 0.2368  3.08  5.1963 21.26 0.2688  0.92 
Constant  -8.4566 -30.05 -2.3169  -7.93 -20.0725  -23.09 -2.0734  -1.99 






















Note:  The z columns report the ratios of the coefficient to its standard error.  The p values are of the test that the population coefficients are jointly zero.  The 
results in all columns are based on random-effects Poisson estimation.  The random effects follow a gamma distribution.  High tech industries include Computers 
& computing equipment (industry 8), Electrical machinery (9), Electronic instruments & communication equipment (10), Transportation equipment (11), Optical 
& medical instruments (13) and Pharmaceuticals (14).  This grouping follows Chandler (Business History Review, Summer 1994). 
 
 
    
 
Appendix I:  Notations Used in the Theoretical Model 
ρi  Internal revenue generated by innovation for entrepreneur in the second period (marketing 
phase); a random variable that is realized at the beginning of the second period 
ρe  External value of innovation in second period to entrepreneur’s rival, net of scientist-
worker’s moving cost (includes a random variable that is realized at the beginning of the 
second period) 
f  Joint density of ρe and ρi 
λ  A rival using the innovation in the second period, markets product that reduces the 
entrepreneur’s revenue received by λρi, where λ ∈ [0,1] 
δ  A patent reduces the entrepreneur’s loss from the rival’s appropriation to (1-δ)λρi, δ ∈ [0,1] 
γ  A patent reduces the rival’s gain from its appropriation by γρi, γ ∈ [0,1].   
ν  The cost to the entrepreneur of patenting; it includes out-of-pocket costs and the costs from 
information disclosure 
w  The marginal product of the scientist who has no experience at the firm 
w0  The entrepreneur’s first period (developmental phase) wage offer to the scientist 
w1  The entrepreneur’s second period (marketing phase) wage offer to the scientist 
p  An indicator variable, equal to one if the entrepreneur patents in the second period and zero, 
otherwise 
S  The set of ρe and ρi such that the scientist remains with the entrepreneur in the 2
nd period 
M  The set of ρe and ρi such that the scientist moves to a rival in the second period 
N  The set of ρe and ρi such that the scientist moves to the non-R&D sector in the 2
nd period 
e ρ   The expected value of ρe 
εe  A noise term; ρe = e ρ + εe 
i ρ   The expected value of ρi 
εi  A noise term; ρi = i ρ  + εi 
g  Joint density of εe and εi 
 
Appendix II:  Decisions on Mobility and Patenting 
We first suppose ρe > λρi, or εe > λη+λ i ρ − e ρ .  The scientist’s gain from establishing or 
joining a rival exceeds the firm’s loss (= λρi − δλρi + w), whether the firm patents or not.  Thus, the 
scientist leaves the entrepreneur for the rival and earns ρe − γρi +w if the entrepreneur patents, and ρe 
+w otherwise.  She patents only if the gain to patenting exceeds its cost, i.e. ν ≤ δλρi.  This first case 
corresponds to the area above line A in Figure 1. 
Suppose, instead, λρi − (δλρi −γρi) < ρe ≤ λρi.  In the absence of patenting, the establishment 
of a rival would cost the entrepreneur more than it would benefit the scientist.  In this case, the 
entrepreneur offers the scientist w1 = ρe +w, the smallest wage that the scientist would accept to stay.  
In this range of ρe, patenting causes the benefit to the scientist from leaving to exceed its cost to the 
entrepreneur.  Thus, when the entrepreneur patents the innovation, the scientist leaves to form a rival.  
The entrepreneur patents if her second period earnings after patenting are greater than they would be 
otherwise.  That is, the entrepreneur patents if ν ≤ ρe – (1−δ)λρi.  This threshold between patenting    
and non-patenting is illustrated in Figure 1 as the solid line in the range εi1 < εi ≤ εi2 connecting the two 
lines A and B.   
Consider now the entrepreneur’s optimal strategy when γρi < ρe ≤ λρi − (δλρi −γρi).  In this 
case, ρe is low enough that whether the firm patents or not, the loss to the entrepreneur if the scientist 
sets up a rival exceeds the scientist’s gain.  Thus, the entrepreneur always offers the scientist the 
minimum w1 to induce him to stay, which is ρe +w if she does not patent, and ρe − γρi +w otherwise.  
By reducing the return to the scientist in his best alternative employment, patenting reduces the wage 
offer necessary to retain him.  Thus, the entrepreneur patents only if ν  ≤  γρi.  This third case 
corresponds to the area between lines B and C in Figure 1. 
ρe may also fall between 0 and γρi.  If the entrepreneur chooses not to patent, the gain to the 
scientist in forming a rival would exceed the loss to the entrepreneur.  Thus, if she does not patent she 
would offer a wage equal to ρe+w to retain the scientist.  If she were to patent and if the scientist were 
to leave, he would choose not to exploit his knowledge since marketing a similar product would earn 
him ρe − γρi < 0.  By patenting, she reduces the wage necessary to retain the scientist by ρe, and thus 
patents only if ν ≤ ρe.  If she patents, she offers the scientist w to stay and earns nothing from the 
scientist’s services.  This fourth case corresponds to the area between lines C and D in Figure 1. 
Finally, suppose ρe < 0.  In this case, the entrepreneur does not patent, and offers w to the 
scientist, who stays in the second period and produces w (the area below line D in Figure 1).   
 
Appendix III:  Industry Classification and Geographical Region Code 
Industry 1: Food & tobacco  
Industry 2: Paper & paper products  
Industry 3 Chemical products  
Industry 4 Plastics & rubber products  
Industry 5: Primary metal products  
Industry 6: Fabricated metal products  
Industry 7: Machinery & engines  
Industry 8: Computers & computing equipment  
Industry 9: Electrical machinery  
Industry 10: Electronic instruments & communication equipment 
Industry 11: Transportation equipment  
Industry 12: Motor vehicles  
Industry 13: Optical & medical instruments  
Industry 14: Pharmaceuticals  
Industry 15: Misc. manufacturing  
    
Region 1: New England 
Region 2: Middle Atlantic 
Region 3: Northeast Central 
Region 4: Northwest Central 
Region 5: South Atlantic 
Region 6: Southeast Central 
Region 7: Southwest Central 
Region 8: Mountain 
Region 9: Pacific    
Endnote 
 
1 The Bureau of Labor Statistics (see the BLS document, Labor Force Statistics from the Current 
Population Survey, online at http://stats.bls.gov/cps_over.htm) reports that the median years of tenure 
with the current employer for engineers fell from 6.3 in 1983 to 4.8 in 2000, a drop of 24 percent. 
2 Gilson has argued that the rise of Silicon Valley is due in large part to the California courts’ refusal 
to enforce non-compete clauses in employment contracts.  Gilson suggests the courts’ refusal to 
enforce these clauses coupled with the natural mobility of scientists and managers resulted in the 
diffusion of technological innovation. (See also Saxenian, 1994).  
3 The entrepreneur risks a competitor discovering the entrepreneur’s idea independently or through 
reverse engineering, without the aid of entrepreneur’s former worker.  One can show that allowing 
competitors to imitate and the entrepreneur to combat it through patenting does not qualitatively 
change our theoretical results below. 
4 In the second period he earns w* if he stays at the same non-R&D firm, or w if he moves.  We 
assume that w* ≥ w since the scientist accumulates firm specific human capital.  For simplicity we let 
w* = w in the following exposition, which does not change our main findings. 
5 When the entrepreneur designs a patent application to establish a monopoly in a certain technological 
area, she will be more likely to tailor the patent to enlarge its immediate benefit δλρi, while, as we 
show below, minimizing γρi.  Thus, the tendency is for larger δλρi relative to γρi. 
6 We are assuming there is no minimum wage, i.e. w0 can be negative. 
7 The proofs can be provided upon request. 
8 Note that we have excluded the scientist’s earnings at a rival from the calculation of a project’s 
R&D.  This is appropriate in the event the scientist only leaves to set up a new firm, where he is 
unlikely to report his activities as R&D.  If, on the other hand, the scientist moves to an established 
firm,  w will almost surely be counted as R&D, if not ρe, too.  In this case, (3) should include on the 
right hand side  () ( ) ( ) ( ) ∫∫ ∫∫
= =
+ − + ρ + + + ρ
1 P M,
i e i e i e e
0 P M,
i e i e e e ε ε ε , ε w γρ ε ε ε ε , ε w ε d d g d d g . 
9  The assumption that the wages paid to the defecting scientist are not counted in the R&D 
expenditures is crucial to the comparative statics we do with R&D.  Alternatively, if we assume that 
both ρe (or ρe −γρi if the innovation is patented) and w  paid by the receiving firm are counted in its 
R&D expenditures, then we can show that mobility has no effect on R&D because an increase in  e ρ  
reduces the wage paid by the entrepreneur by the same amount it increases the expenditures at the 
rival. 
10 Pakes and Nitzan also find that improvements in the scientist’s outside opportunities cause the wage 
paid to fall commensurately. Technical knowledge acquired by the scientist is a form of general 
human capital, so this result is not surprising (see Becker, 1964). Moen (2000) provides empirical 
support for this result. Using Norwegian matched employer-employee data, he finds that technical 
workers in R&D intensive firms accept lower wages early in their career in exchange for higher wages 
later.   
11 We include the following occupation categories for scientists and engineers (the three-digit 1980 
standard occupational classifications are in parentheses):  Engineers (044-059), Mathematical and 
computer scientists (064-068), Natural scientists (069-083), Clinical laboratory technologists and 
technicians (203), Engineering and related technologists and technicians (213-216), Science 
technicians (223-225), and Computer programmers (229).   
12 See the industry classification in Appendix III. 
13 According to the CPS data, the average of ECR over the period 1975 to 1992 is 0.11. This is lower 
than the average job turnover rate for all workers during 1975-95, at 0.28 (Stewart, 1998). Turnover 
    
 
rates may be lower for scientists and engineers because they are more highly educated, more often 
male, and older than the average worker.  In general workers with these traits have lower job turnover 
rates.  
14 Ideally, we would like measures of mobility for each industry in each geographical area.  Because 
the size of the sample is too small to estimate separate industry measures by region, we construct 
mobility estimates for scientists and engineers aggregating across industries in 9 regions (see 
Appendix II), and then match these measures to firms by their region of incorporation. 
15 Details of the matching process and the resulting data file can be found in Hall and Ziedonis, Hall, 
Jaffe, and Trajtenberg (1999), and Hall (1990).   
16 Hall and Ziedonis, inspired by Merges and Nelson (1990), also include a dummy variable capturing 
whether the firm owned and operated its own manufacturer or specialized in product design alone.  
The authors reason that manufacturing firms may be more likely to patent because they may require 
access to a larger set of process and product technologies than design firms, making them vulnerable 
to a patent infringement lawsuit.  We have not included this variable in our analysis since collecting 
information on firm type is prohibitively costly for our much larger sample, and the random or fixed 
effects we use in our estimation models will pick this up. 
17 A Box-Cox test shows that the logarithmic form of the mobility variable produces a better fit than 
the linear form.  Moreover, when run with the linear form of the mobility variable, our model 
generally produces results that are qualitatively and quantitatively similar to the results produced with 
the log form. 
18 Our use of contemporaneous R&D, as opposed to lagged R&D, follows the extensive literature 
estimating patent production functions (e.g., Hall, Grilliches, and Hausman, 1986).  Evidence suggests 
that R&D activities and innovations occur somewhat simultaneously.  Moreover, if a firm attempts to 
patent an innovation, it files the application while the innovation is being developed or very shortly 
afterwards (Hall et al.).   
19 The sample used in Panel 4 is smaller than in Panel 1 because some firms in the Compustat data do 
not report a location.  
20 The reader should note the following caveat for the GEO measure: The geographical measure of 
mobility is based on the state of the firm's incorporation. For many large firms, only a portion (or 
perhaps none) of their R&D operations are located in the state of their incorporation.   
21 We added polynomial terms until the change in log-likelihood ceased to be statistically significant. 
We report the results from a sixth order polynomial expansion of ECR because we found no statistical 
difference in the log-likelihood when we went from a sixth order to a seventh order expansion. 
22 We thank Frank Windmeijer for providing his Gauss program, EXPEND, used to estimate these 
models (see Windmeijer, 2002). 
23 The propensity to patent and mobility may be related through other shared factors.  For example, the 
advent of a new technology may lead both to more patenting and increase the re-shuffling of workers 
among firms.  Suppose there are two industries employing biochemists.  In industry A, biochemists 
develop drugs to fight disease and in industry B they are employed for another purpose.  Suppose in 
industry A, a new technology is developed that lowers the costs of drug discovery, raising the 
marginal product of biochemists working there.  We would then expect that firms in industry B would 
lure biochemists from industry A, raising mobility, until the marginal products are equal across 
industries.  Simultaneously, the new drugs enabled by the technological shock would generate new 
patents.  By using the GMM, we can isolate the effect of mobility on patenting from those of other 
factors which simultaneously influence mobility and patenting.   
24 A Basmann’s test applied to the linear regression specification indicates these variables can be 
excluded from the estimated regressions and used as instruments. The mean age of scientists is used as 
    
 
a regressor instead of an instrument since the Basmann’s test rejects the hypothesis that it is 
excludable from the reduced-form model. 
25 We use as instruments the second through fourth lags of the mobility and R&D measures, and the 
contemporaneous through fourth lags of the remaining variables. 
26 These calculations are based on the estimated coefficients associated with LnECR and LnGEO in 
panels 1 and 4 of Table 3, assuming that R&D expenditures are not affected by changes in these 
mobility measures. The predicted reductions of the patent-R&D ratio are derived as exp(.0287*ln2) = 
1.02 and exp(0.1303*ln2) = 1.09. The other calculations described below are derived similarly. 
27 Among engineers, the median tenure with the current employer experienced a similar decline over 
that period. See endnote 1. 
28 Science and Engineering Indicators (National Science Foundation, 1998) reports that average 
annual domestic patents granted per billion research dollars in the U.S. (expressed in 1982-84 dollars) 
rose from 401 in 1984 to 475 in 1997. 
29 These calculations are based on post-1986 data only because 1987 is the first year in which the CPS 
contains the size of workers’ employers by number of employees. 